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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MERLE LEE ALLRED,
Plaintiff and Counterclaim
Defendant,
vs.
Court of Appeals# 940535-CA
ANN ANASTASTION,
Defendant, Crossclaim
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l e e ,

District Court # 910906462

SEAN ANASTASION,
D e f e n d a n t and C r o s s c l a i m
Defendant,
PACIFICORP ELECTRIC OPERATION and
AETNA HEALTH PLANS,
Defendants, Counterclaim
P l a i n t i f f s , Crossclaim
P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s .

Priority # 15

BRIEF OF APPELLEE ANN ANASTASION

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this
appeal pursuant to Article VIII Sections 1 and 3 of the
Constitution of Utah; Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a3(2) (j) (Supp. 1993); and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure (1993).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE ONE:
Whether the trial court was correct in ruling that
because the Offer of Judgment was made to Plaintiff Merle Lee
Allred (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), and was not made to Pacificorp
Electric Operations and Aetna Health Plans (hereinafter "Aetna"),
that Aetna did not have any right or authority to accept the
Offer of Judgment Ann Anastasion made to Plaintiff.
ISSUE TWO:
Whether the trial court was correct in ruling that,
based on all the facts and circumstances presented by this case,
the Judgment entered against Ann Anastasion should be set aside.
ISSUE THREE:
Whether the trial court was correct in awarding Ann
Anastasion the costs she .necessarily and reasonably incurred in
successfully disputing Aetna's claims for damages.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE ONE:
The Court's determination that Aetna had no right or
authority to accept the Offer of Judgment Ann Anastasion made to
Plaintiff is a conclusion of law and should be reviewed for
correctness and accorded no particular deference.
Interest of J.J.T.. 877 P.2d 161 (Utah App. 1994).
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State in
The trial

court's conclusion of law, however, is based upon factual
findings which have not been challenged on appeal.

Since Aetna

has failed to marshal the evidence or challenge the trial court's
factual determinations the Appellate Court should assume that the
record supports the findings of the trial court and review of the
accuracy of the trial court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law to the facts found by the trial court.
Jacobs v. Hafen, 875 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah App. 1994).

A clearly

erroneous standard is used to review a trial court's findings of
fact.

They will not be overturned unless they are "against the

clear weight of the evidence or the appellate court reaches a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
State v. Murphy, 872 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah App. 1994) citations
omitted.
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE TWO;
Trial courts are "vested with considerable discretion
under Rule 60(b) in granting or denying [motions] to set aside []
judgment [s] ." Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1987).

A

trial court's decision to set aside a judgment under Rule 60(b)
can only be reversed if an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.
Id.
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE THREE;
A trial court's determination regarding the award of
costs is also reviewed "under an abuse of discretion standard"
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah App. 1992) and should only
3

be disturbed if "it is so unreasonable as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion." Ames v. Mass, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah App.
1993) quoting Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Wav. 753 P.2d 507,
512 (Utah App. 1988).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS
Rules 5, 54, 60(b), and 68(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure are determinative of the issues on appeal and
pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
are included respectively as: Addendum "A"; Addendum "B";
Addendum "C"; and Addendum "D" to Defendant's Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was commenced as a negligence action against
Ann Anastasion for personal injuries suffered by Plaintiff when
she cut her ankle on a sheet of metal located in Ann Anastasion's
garage.

After commencement of this action Plaintiff amended her

Complaint to include Sean Anastasion and Aetna as parties.
Plaintiff's claims against Sean Anastasion were also based in
negligence.

Because Aetna had paid a portion of Plaintiff's

medical bills resulting from her injury, Plaintiff named Aetna as
a Defendant so its subrogation rights arising from the incident

4

at the heart of this lawsuit could be ascertained.

Following

Aetna's injection into this lawsuit, it filed Crossclaims against
Ann Anastasion and Sean Anastasion and a Counterclaim against
Plaintiff for any monies recovered as a result of the lawsuit.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint was filed on
October 13, 1991, and served on Ann Anastasion on October 24,
1991. [R. pp. 6-11]1.

Aetna was made a party to this lawsuit

when it was served with Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint on
June 2, 1992.

Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint, among other

things, alleged that:
Defendant [Aetna] is the health insurance carrier for
the plaintiff, and has a subrogation interest in any
funds received by plaintiff herein, either by way of
verdict, judgment or settlement in this action.
Further, plaintiff's prosecution of this action and/or
settlement of this action may tend to have the effect
of settling or compromising the subrogation rights of
[Aetna], and, therefore, [Aetna], by reason of its
subrogation interest, is a correct and proper party to
this action.
Aetna [] is the administrator of [Plaintiff's] health
insurance plan....
[R. pp.57-60].

Aetna answered Plaintiff's Third Amended

Complaint and admitted it had a subrogation right in any funds
received by plaintiff as a result of this lawsuit. [R. p.73].

1

Unless otherwise stated all references are to the Record as
paginated by the Clerk of the Third District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
5

Aetna's Answer included a Counterclaim against
Plaintiff which asserted both contractual and common law rights
to be subrogated to Plaintiff's claims against Ann Anastasion and
Sean Anastasion. [R. p.74].

Aetna's Answer also included

Crossclaims against Ann Anastasion and Sean Anastasion.

Aetna's

Crossclaim contended that "[b]y virtue of its payment [of
plaintiff's medical bills, it was] entitled, both contractually
and under common law principles to be subrogated to the claims of
plaintiff against defendants Anastasion in this matter." [R.
p.75].

Ann Anastasion answered Aetna's Crossclaim denying that

she was negligent or liable to Plaintiff or Aetna for any amount.
[R. p.78].
Throughout the discovery and settlement negotiations of
this case Ann Anastasion denied any liability for Plaintiff's
injuries or the medical bills paid by Aetna.

On June 30, 1993,

Ann Anastasion filed a motion and memorandum attempting to have
Aetna dropped from the lawsuit or in the alternative to have the
parties realigned to more accurately reflect Aetna's interests as
a plaintiff. [R. pp.105-10].

Aetna opposed Ann Anastasion's

motion, arguing that it was subrogated to the claims of its
insured and was a necessary party to this lawsuit. [R. p.118].
On August 2, 1993, Judge Hanson issued a Minute Entry setting
forth his decision to deny Ann Anastasion's motion to drop Aetna
from this lawsuit or realign the parties. [R. pp.185-86].
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Judge

Hanson signed an order denying Ann Anastasion's motion on August
17, 1993. [R. pp.287-88A].
After Ann Anastasion filed her Motion to drop Aetna
from this lawsuit, but before Judge Hanson ruled on that motion,
Ann Anastasion submitted an Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff
offering to allow judgment to be taken against her for Seventeen
Thousand Five Hundred and No/100 Dollars. [R. pp. 139-40 and SSISB] .

Plaintiff did not accept Ann Anastasion's Offer of

Judgment.

Aetna, however, did attempt to accept Ann Anastasion's

offer to Plaintiff. [R. pp. 145-46].

Immediately after learning

of Aetna's desire to accept the Offer of Judgment which she had
made to Plaintiff, Ann Anastasion contacted Aetna to clarify its
mistake.

Ann Anastastion informed Aetna that the Offer of

Judgment: WAS NOT intended for Aetna's acceptance; WAS made to
Plaintiff; WAS intended to end all litigation associated with
this claim; WAS served on Aetna pursuant to the service
requirements of Rule 5 Utah R. Civ. P.; and WAS clearly in excess
of Aetna's total claim against Ann Anastasion. [R. pp. 188-89,
210-12, and 361-65].

In spite of that information Aetna informed

Ann Anastasion that it intended to attempt to enforce its
purported acceptance of the Offer of Judgment.

Thereafter, Ann

Anastasion filed a motion and memorandum to have Aetna's
purported acceptance of the Offer of Judgment stricken. [R.
pp.199-218].

In total disregard for the disputed nature of

Aetna's purported acceptance of Ann Anastasion's Offer of
7

Judgment to Plaintiff, Aetna requested and obtained a Judgment
against Ann Anastasion based upon the disputed acceptance of the
Offer of Judgment. [R. pp.233-37],

Ann Anastasion then moved the

trial court for an order setting aside the Judgment entered
against her. [R. pp.259-81].

After reviewing the memoranda

submitted and hearing oral argument on the issue Judge Hanson
granted Ann Anastasion's Motion to strike Aetna's purported
acceptance of the Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff.

Consequently,

Judge Hanson also granted Ann Anastasion's Motion to set aside
the Judgment entered against her.
The trial court's decision to strike Aetna's purported
acceptance of the Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff and to set aside
the Judgment entered against Ann Anastasion was based upon the
following facts:
1.

Ann Anastasion made an Offer of Judgment to Merle
Allred.

2.

The Offer of Judgment was never made nor extended to
Pacificorp or Aetna for their acceptance.

3.

The Offer of Judgment was intended to end all
litigation associated with Merle Allred's claim for
personal injuries against Ann Anastasion.

4.

Pacificorp and Aetna attempted to accept the Offer of
Judgment and obtained a judgment against Ann Anastasion
pursuant to that purported acceptance.

5.

Pacificorp and Aetna's only interest in this lawsuit is
a subrogation interest in Merle Allred's claim against
Ann Anastasion for reimbursement of monies it paid out
for and on behalf of Merle Allred.

6.

The amount set forth in Ann Anastasion's Offer of
Judgment to Merle Allred ($17,500.00) was over
8

$2,500.00 greater than the amount Pacificorp and Aetna
had paid for Merle Allred's medical bills.
7.

Counsel for Ann Anastasion disputed Pacificorp's and
Aetna's right and capacity to accept the Offer of
Judgment as soon as they learned Pacificorp and Aetna
had attempted to accept it.

8.

Pacificorp's and Aetna's claimed subjective belief that
the Offer of Judgment was made to them was not
reasonable.

9.

Pacificorp's and Aetna's failure to accept Ann
Anastasion's Offer of Judgment would not have obliged
Pacificorp and Aetna to pay Ann Anastasion's costs in
the event a verdict less favorable that the Offer of
Judgment was obtained against Ann Anastasion.

[R. pp.361-365].

A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order are attached hereto as "Addendum E."
This case was tried to a jury in February of 1994.
After a trial on the merits, the case was submitted to the jury
on special verdict interrogatories.

The jury answered the

following interrogatories:
1.

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
Defendant, Ann anastasion was negligent?
YES

2.

NO XX

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you
find from a preponderance of the evidence that the
Defendant, Sean Anastasion was negligent?
YES

NO XX

The trial court then entered a Judgment on the Jury Verdict which
dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims and Aetna's Crossclaims
against Ann Anastasion with prejudice.

A copy of the Judgment on

the Jury Verdict is attached hereto as "Addendum F."
9

The Judgment on the Jury Verdict also awarded Ann
Anastasion the costs she incurred in successfully defending this
action. [R. pp.681-83].

Aetna objected to the Judgment on the

Jury Verdict and to the award of costs to Ann Anastasion. [R.
pp.684-87].

The initial Judgment on the Jury Verdict did not

apportion payment of those costs between Aetna and Plaintiff.
Nevertheless, after receiving and considering memoranda on
Aetna's objections the trial court clarified its ruling on the
costs awarded to Ann Anastasion.

In a June 8, 1994, Minute Entry

Judge Hanson ruled that because Aetna's subrogation claim for the
amount it paid to or on behalf of Plaintiff was not disputed,
Aetna would not be responsible for any costs incurred by Ann
Anastasion to dispute Plaintiff's claims for damages.

The court

also ruled that Aetna would be obligated for those costs
"relating to liability questions...," [R. pp.889-95].

After

additional objections and some confusion the trial court finally
signed and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an
Order which stated:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff paid the statutory jury demand fee of $50.00.

2.

Subsequently and unnecessarily, Defendant Ann
Anastasion also paid the statutory jury demand fee of
$50.00.

3.

Aetna's only involvement in this litigation dealt with
its subrogation rights as Plaintiff's health insurance
carrier and, throughout this litigation and for all
purposes, stood in the shoes of Plaintiff.
10

The amount paid by Aetna for and on behalf of Merle
Allred was not in dispute.
Aetna's only role in the trial of this matter was in
regards to Defendants' liability for the incident that
caused Plaintiff's injury.
Depositions of the following individuals were all
necessarily and reasonably taken to properly defend
this action:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Plaintiff, Merle Lee Allred;
Defendant, Sean Anastasion;
Defendant, Ann Anastasion;
Becky Sue Neville;
Dr. Robert Hansen; and
Dr. G. Lynn Rasmussen.

Defendant Ann Anastasion necessarily and reasonably
paid the statutory witness fee of Seventeen and No/100
Dollars ($17.00) to the following individuals:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)

Holy Cross Hospital;
Dr. Robert P. Hansen;
Defendant, Sean Anastasion;
Ted Conger, D.C.;
Dr. David E. Curtis;
Bryan Drennan; and
Dr. G. Lynn Rasmussen.

After a trial on the merits Defendant, Ann Anastasion,
was the prevailing party.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Pursuant to Rule 54(d) Defendant Ann Anastasion, as the
prevailing party, is entitled to recover those costs
and fees she necessarily and reasonably incurred in
defending this action.
Defendant Ann Anastasion cannot recover the amount she
unnecessarily paid to request a jury.
Aetna and Plaintiff are jointly and severally liable
for the costs incurred by Defendant Ann Anastasion
which relate to liability for the accident which
injured Plaintiff.
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4.

Plaintiff is solely liable for the costs and fees
incurred by Defendant Ann Anastasion which related to
the establishment or rebuttal of Plaintiff's claimed
damages.
ORDER

After reviewing the memoranda submitted by all parties and
the applicable law, being fully informed and for good cause
shown the Court hereby Orders that:
1.

2.

Both Aetna and Plaintiff are jointly and severally
liable to Ann Anastasion, the prevailing party, for the
following costs:
a)

court reporter fees for the depositions of
Defendant Ann Anastasion, Defendant Sean
Anastasion and Plaintiff, Merle L. Allred (first
deposition only) in an amount of $ 288.10; and

b)

witness fees paid to Sean Anastasion and Bryan
Drennan in an amount of $34.00.

Plaintiff is solely liable to Ann Anastasion, the
prevailing party, for the following costs:
a)

court reporter fees for the depositions of Merle
L. Allred (2nd deposition only), Becky Sue
Neville, Dr. Robert P. Hansen, and Dr. G. Lynn
Rasmussen in the amount of $874.70; and

b)

witness fees paid to Holy Cross Hospital, Dr.
Robert P. Hansen, Ted Conger, D.C., Dr. David E.
Curtis, Bryan Drennan, and Dr. G. Lynn Rasmussen
in the amount of $119.00.

3.

Defendant Ann Anastasion can only collect a total of
One Thousand Three Hundred Fifteen and 80/100 Dollars
($1,315.80) of the costs necessarily incurred in
successfully defending against Plaintiff's and Aetna's
claims. Plaintiff Merle L. Allred, is solely liable
for $993.70 of that amount and Defendant Ann Anastasion
can collect the remaining $322.10 from either of the
parties or a portion from each of them.

4.

Judgment shall be entered against Pacificorp Electric
Operations and Aetna Health Plans in favor of Ann
Anastasion in the amount of Three Hundred Twenty Two
and 10/100 Dollars ($322.10).
12

5.

Judgment shall be entered against Merle Lee Allred in
favor of Ann Anastasion in the amount of One Thousand
Three Hundred Fifteen and 80/100 Dollars ($1,315.80).

[R. pp. 970-75]2.

A copy of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and Order regarding the award of costs is attached hereto as
"Addendum "G"
Aetna has appealed the trial court's decision to strike
its purported acceptance of the Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff,
the trial court's decision to set aside the judgment based upon
that ineffective acceptance, and the trial court's award of some
of the costs in this case to Ann Anastasion and against Aetna.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts relevant to the issues on appeal are included
in the preceding section "Course of Proceedings and Disposition
Below."

Ann Anastasion does not believe there are any additional

facts that have any bearing on the issues involved in this
appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Ann Anastasion made an Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff
in order to end all litigation associated with Plaintiff's claim.

2

As of the date on which this Brief was prepared the Clerk
of the Third District Court had not yet numbered the pages of the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order regarding costs
which was finally signed by Judge Hanson. Pages 970-75 represent
the page numbers that would be affixed to the pages of the record
if the unnumbered pages were consecutively numbered by the clerk
from the last page of the transcript of oral argument until the
last page in the file.
13

Aetna was not the recipient or offeree of that Offer of Judgment
and had no right, power or authority to accept it.

An essential

element of a legally enforceable agreement is a meeting of the
minds, or mutual assent by ALL parties.
no meeting of the minds.

In this case there was

An offer was made to Plaintiff to end

all litigation and Aetna attempted to distort that offer into a
judgment against Ann Anastasion.

Aetna was provided with a copy

of the Offer of Judgment as required by Rule 5 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure which states: "...every written notice,
appearance, demand, offer of judgment...and similar paper shall
be served upon each of the parties."
Utah R. Civ. P.

(emphasis added) Rule 5

Ann Anastasion's compliance with Rule 5,

however, should not be misconstrued to create an unintended
obligation on Ann Anastasion.
Because the Offer of Judgment was not made to Aetna,
the Judgment entered pursuant to Aetna's purported acceptance of
the Offer of Judgment was properly set aside.

The nature of

Plaintiff's claims, the facts of the case and the jury's verdict
in this matter all support Judge Hanson's decision that due to
the mistake, fairness, equity and justice required the Judgment
to be set aside.
Rule 54(d) Utah R. Civ. P. mandates that the prevailing
party recover its costs in successfully defending a claim.

In

the instant case Ann Anastasion was the prevailing party.

Judge

Hanson's decision to award Ann Anastasion her costs is supported
14

by the facts and circumstances of this case as well as the
applicable rules.

His decision to make Aetna responsible for

only those costs associated with disputing liability is well
founded in reason, equity and the law.

ARGUMENT
I.

BECAUSE ANN ANASTASION MADE AN OFFER OF JUDGMENT TO
PLAINTIFF TO END ALL LITIGATION AND DID NOT MAKE ANY OFFER
TO AETNA, AETNA DID NOT HAVE ANY RIGHT, POWER OR AUTHORITY
TO ACCEPT THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT AND THEREFORE THERE WAS NO
MEETING OF THE MINDS NECESSARY TO CREATE AN ENFORCEABLE
AGREEMENT AND AETNA'S PURPORTED ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER OF
JUDGMENT WAS VOID
The trial court determined that Ann Anastasion made an

Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff and that the Offer of Judgment was
intended to end all litigation in this matter and was not made to
or intended for Aetna.

The court also found that, in light of

the facts and circumstances surrounding the Offer of Judgment,
Aetna's claimed subjective belief that it could accept the Offer
of Judgment was unreasonable. [R. pp.361-65],

Since Aetna has

failed to challenge those factual determinations they should form
the basis for this Court's decision.
Aetna contends that its receipt of Ann Anastasion's
Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff created, in it, a power of
acceptance.

That claimed power of acceptance is apparently based

upon contract principles.

Aetna, however, has failed to

recognize that it only received a copy of Ann Anastasion's Offer
of Judgment to Plaintiff because Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of
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Civil Procedure requires that all offers of judgment be provided
to all parties. Rule 5 Utah R. Civ. P. (1993).

While the Offer

of Judgment did not specify on its face that it was for
Plaintiff's acceptance only, a multitude of facts in existence at
the time the Offer of Judgment was filed evidence that the Offer
of Judgment was intended for Plaintiff and not for Aetna.

Those

facts include: Aetna's admitted role in this litigation as
nothing more than a subrogated party to Plaintiff's claim; the
purposes of a Rule 68 Utah R. Civ. P. offer of judgment; the
pending motion to have Aetna dismissed from the litigation; the
fact that Aetna's total claim was significantly less than the
Offer of Judgment; the hotly contested liability issues involved
in this dispute; and prior attempts to negotiate a settlement of
this dispute with a lump sum payment.
A.

A Meeting Of The Minds Is Necessary Before A Legally
Binding Agreement Can Be Reached
Aetna's arguments also ignore the well settled

principle of contract law that an essential condition "precedent
to the enforcement of any contract is that there be meeting of
the minds of the parties, which must be spelled out, either
expressly or impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be
enforced."

Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah

1988); quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah
1961).

"[T] here can be no contract without the mutual assent of

the parties."

John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp.,
16

743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987).

"[M]utual assent requires

assent by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that
their minds meet as to all terms."

Crimson v. Western Co. of

North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1983); quoting Cessna
Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978).

In order

to determine whether there is mutual assent by the parties, the
parties' intentions are controlling.
P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977).

Oberhansly v. Earle, 572

See also Zions First Natl. Bank v.

Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Utah 1977).

Whether or not a party

intended to enter into a contract is a question of fact to be
decided by the trial court.
(Utah 1981).

O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1290

The Utah Supreme Court's ruling in O'Hara was based

in part upon a quote from a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision
which stated "[t]here is not a meeting of the minds where the
parties do not intend to contract and the question of intent
generally is one to be determined by the trier of fact."
Household Utilities v. The Andreiss Co., 236 N.W.2d 663 (Wis.
1976) .
In the instant case the trial court determined that Ann
Anastasion's Offer of Judgment was an attempt to settle this
lawsuit and was not an invitation intended for Aetna's
acceptance.

Without the intent to enter into an agreement, there

could be no mutual assent by Ann Anastasion and Aetna.
Consequently, a meeting of the minds would have been impossible.
Without a meeting of the minds there is no enforceable agreement
17

and Judge Hanson's decision to strike Aetna's purported
acceptance of Ann Anastasion's Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff was
proper and should be upheld.
B.

One Party7 s Expectation Or Belief Cannot Create A
Meeting Of The Minds
One party's unsubstantiated expectations cannot

establish a meeting of the minds sufficient to create an
enforceable contact.

Seare v. University of Utah School of Med.,

248 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9-10 (Utah App. 1994).

An honest

difference of understanding is fatal to the creation of a
contract.

Ingram v. Forrer, 563 P.2d 181 (Utah 1977).

In the

instant case, Aetna's claimed belief that Ann Anastastion offered
to permit it to take a judgment against her demonstrates the
differing beliefs of the two involved parties.

Such a difference

of understanding is a barrier preventing the creation of an
enforceable agreement.
C.

The Party Attempting To Enforce A Contract Has The
Burden Of Proving The Existence Of A Contract
The burden to prove the existence of a contract is on

the party seeking to enforce it.

Oberhanslv, 572 P.2d at 1386;

citing B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1972).
See also Spanish Fork Packing Co. v. House of Fine Meats, 508
P.2d 1186, 1187 (Utah 1973).

Aetna has hinged its entire

argument on its claimed subjective belief that Ann Anastasion's
Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff was intended for its acceptance.
Aetna, however, has failed to produce any support for the
18

elements necessary to establish a meeting of the minds and the
existence of an enforceable agreement.

Judge Hanson, found

Aetna's alleged belief to be unreasonable.

Aetna's erroneous

assumption should, therefore, make no difference in the outcome
of this appeal, and Judge Hanson's decision to strike Aetna's
purported acceptance of Ann Anastasion's Offer of Judgment to
Plaintiff should be upheld.
Judge Hanson's determination that Ann Anastasion's
Offer of Judgment would have no force or effect on Aetna
eliminates Aetna's argument that it was forced to accept the
Offer of Judgment.

Additionally, Aetna was specifically advised

that the Offer of Judgment was not intended for its acceptance
and would not impact Aetna.

Aetna, however, disregarded that

information and took additional steps to attempt to accept and
enforce the Offer of Judgment. [R. pp.947-50].

Irregardless of

the potential impact of the Offer of Judgment on Aetna, there was
no meeting of the minds and, therefore, Ann Anastasion has no
legal obligation to recognize Aetna's meaningless acceptance of
her Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff.
D.

Rule 68 Utah R. Civ. P. Would Be Frustrated If Aetna's
Acceptance Of Ann Anastasion's Offer Of Judgment To
Plaintiff Is Recognized As Valid

Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is intended to
facilitate the economic, reasonable and efficient resolution of
claims.

To force Ann Anastasion to be indebted to Aetna for the

amount set forth in her Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff and still
19

defend her claims against Aetna would frustrate rather than
promote the purpose behind Rule 68.

This is particularly true

where the status of the party attempting to accept an offer of
judgment is nothing more than a subrogated party.

Aetna did not

have any independent claim against Ann Anastasion.
based entirely and solely on Plaintiff's claim.

Its claim was

It would be

ludicrous to subject Ann Anastasion to a Judgment pursuant to
Aetna's purported acceptance of the Offer of Judgment and then
subject Ann Anastasion to the rigors of jury trial.

In order to

promote the purposes of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and to
protect the interests of the parties to this lawsuit Judge
Hanson's decision striking Aetna's purported acceptance of the
Offer of Judgment should be upheld.
II.

BECAUSE AETNA'S PURPORTED ACCEPTANCE OF ANN ANASTASION'S
OFFER OF JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF WAS MEANINGLESS, THE JUDGMENT
ENTERED BASED UPON THAT PURPORTED ACCEPTANCE WAS PROPERLY
SET ASIDE
The trial court ordered that in the interests of

justice the Judgment entered against Ann Anastasion be set aside
due to mistake. [R. pp.950-51].

The facts and circumstances of

this case and the law set forth above clearly supports that
ruling.

Aetna has failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that

Judge Hanson's decision was an abuse of discretion and the trial
court's ruling setting aside the judgment should be upheld.
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO AWARD ANN ANASTASION HER COSTS
AGAINST AETNA IS SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND MANDATED BY RULE
54(c) UTAH R. CIV. P.
Ann Anastasion was forced into court against her will.
She made reasonable efforts to resolve this dispute prior to the
jury trial conducted in February of 1994.

Nevertheless, due to

the positions taken by Aetna and Plaintiff, this matter proceeded
to trial.

After the trial the jury found Ann Anastasion without

fault for the incident at the heart of Aetna's and Plaintiff's
claims.

The Jury's verdict made Ann Anastasion the prevailing

party to this lawsuit.
Rule 54(d) Utah R. Civ. P. states that "... costs SHALL
BE AWARDED AS OF COURSE to the prevailing party..." (emphasis
added).

The award of "costs is within the sound discretion of

the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion."

Ong Intl. (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d

447, 460 (Utah 1993) . After the presentation of evidence and a
trial on the merits Ann Anastasion was the prevailing party and
as such should be awarded the costs she incurred to successfully
defend Plaintiff's and Aetna's claims against her.

The rule

followed in Utah is that the prevailing party is entitled to
recover "those fees which are required to be paid to the court
and to witnesses"

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah

1980) as well as the costs and expenses that are "necessary to
the presentation and preparation of a case."
475; citing Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774.
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Ames, 846 P.2d at

Taxable costs include

expenses for depositions "taken in good faith and, in light of
the circumstances, appeared to be essential for the development
and presentation of the case." Id.
Because Aetna's claimed damages were liquidated and the
only contingency on its recovery was liability for Plaintiff's
injury, the trial court ruled that Aetna would only be held
responsible for the costs incurred to defend issues of liability.
[R. pp. 970-75]3

The trial court found that the depositions of

Plaintiff, Ann Anastasion and Sean Anastasion, as well as the
witness fees paid to Sean Anastasion and Bryan Drennan, were
necessarily and reasonably incurred to dispute liability.
are the only costs that Aetna was ordered to pay.

Those

Plaintiff was

burdened with all of the costs incurred to dispute her claims for
damages.

The trial court's ruling which requires Aetna to bear

the costs incurred by Ann Anastasion in disputing liability for
its claims is well within its discretion and should not be
overturned on appeal.
Aetna propounds conflicting arguments.

In one section

of its brief it argues that it accepted the Offer of Judgment
because it did not want to be held liable for Ann Anastasion's
costs.

In another section of its brief it argues that it cannot

and should not be held responsible for Ann Anastasion's costs.
Aetna's reliance on Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847

3

See Footnote 2.
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(Utah 1978), is misplaced.

Suniland is factually and

procedurally distinct from this case.

In Suniland, the appellant

was unable to demonstrate that the trial court's decision was an
abuse of discretion.

Furthermore, in Suniland, the plaintiff and

not the defendant prevailed.

In this case Aetna filed a

Crossclaim against Ann Anastasion claiming that she was negligent
and that her negligence had resulted in its having to pay a
portion of Plaintiff's medical bills.
at trial.

Those claims were defeated

Aetna collected nothing on its Crossclaim and the

costs awarded by Judge Hanson were necessarily and reasonably
incurred to defeat Aetna's contention of liability.
Utah law permits the prevailing party to recover the
costs incurred to litigate a lawsuit.
recovered from the losing parties.

The costs are to be

In the instant case Defendant

Ann Anastasion was the prevailing party and Aetna lost.

The

trial court's decision to award Ann Anastasion her costs was
reasonable, supported by the rules and the law and does not
amount to an abuse of its discretion.

Judge Hanson's decision,

therefore should also be upheld.
IV,

AETNA'S APPEAL WAS FRIVOLOUS OR FOR DELAY AND ANN ANASTASION
SHOULD BE AWARDED DOUBLE HER COSTS AND REASONABLE ATTORNEY
FEES FOR RESPONDING TO AETNA'S BRIEF
Rule 33 Utah R. App. P. permits this court to award

double costs and attorney fees when an appeal "is not grounded in
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith
23

argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law" or is
"interposed for an improper purpose such as to harass, cause
needless increase in the cost of litigation, or

gain time that

will benefit only the party filing the appeal..." Rule 33(a) and
(b) Utah R. App. P.

Aetna's conduct throughout this entire case

manifests an abuse of the legal system.

This appeal has no

reasonable factual or legal basis and an award of sanctions and
costs would be appropriate.

O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 3 06 (Utah

App. 1987) . Ann Anastasion, therefore, requests that she be
awarded double her costs and the reasonable attorney fees
incurred in responding to Aetna's appeal.

CONCLUSION
The Offer of Judgment filed by Ann Anastasion was made to
Plaintiff and not to Aetna.
accept it.

Aetna had no right or authority to

Its purported acceptance was unreasonable under the

facts and circumstances of this case and Aetna has failed to
demonstrate that there was or ever could have been a meeting of
the minds regarding the Offer of Judgment.

Aetna's arguments to

the contrary are without factual and legal support.

Judge Hanson

correctly vacated Aetna's purported acceptance of Ann
Anastasion's Offer of Judgment to Plaintiff and properly set
aside the Judgment which was based upon that meaningless
acceptance.

Judge Hanson's award of costs against Aetna is

supported by the facts of this case, the rules and was well
24

within the discretionary authority granted to trial courts.

This

appeal was taken without any substantial likelihood of success
and Aetna and or its attorneys should be ordered to pay double
Ann Anastasion's costs as well as the attorney fees incurred
during this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _/

day of December, 1994.

SCALLEY Sc READING
Attorneys for Ann Anastasion

By: Steven B. Smith
MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that on the

/

day of December,

1994, I mailed two true and correct copies of Ann Anastasion's
Brief, first class, U.S. mail, postage prepaid to the following:
Blake Atkin
Johnathan Hawkins
ATKIN Sc LILJA
50 South Street, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
and
Kelly Sheffield
1364 Emigration Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
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Steven B. Smith
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Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules,
every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to
the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand,
offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d),
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be
made on parties in default for failure to appear except as provided in Rule
55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims
for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attachment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named
as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer,
claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the time of its seizure.
(b) Service: How made.
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be
made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made
upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or, if no
address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a
copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the party; or
leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or,
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if
the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon
mailing.
(2) A resident attorney, on whom pleadings and other papers may be
served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any foreign attorney
practicing in any of the courts of this state.
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there are unusually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any crossclaim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the
plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order
shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs.
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a
party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable
time thereafter, but the court may upon motion of a party or on its own
initiative order that depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on
order of the court or for use in the proceeding.
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with
the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the papers to be filed
with him, in which event he shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith
transmit them to the office of the clerk, if any.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.)
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Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 5(d) is
amended to give the trial court the option, either on an ad hoc basis or by local rule, of ordering that discovery papers, depositions, written interrogatories, document requests, requests for admission, and answers and xesponses need not be filed unless required for
specific use in the case. The committee is of the
view that a local rule of the district courts on
the subject should be encouraged.

Rule 6

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 5, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — How civil action commenced, U.R.C.P. 3(a).
Service by mail, additional time after,
U.R.CP. 6(e).
Third-party practice, U.R.CP. 14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Filed depositions.
Service upon attorney.
—Presumption of authorization.
When service required.
—Default judgment.
Appeal.
Cited.
Filed depositions.
Sealed pretrial depositions filed with a court
are presumptively public under the Utah Public and Private Writings Act (former § 78-26-1
et seq.; see now Title 63, Chapter 2) and can be
kept secret only on a showing of good cause.
Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 P 2 d
1095 (Utah 1990).
Service upon attorney.
—Presumption of authorization.
Where defendant engaged attorney only to
file motion but never so notified court or attorney, appearance of attorney to file motion
raised presumption that he represented defendant in full action. Where defendant presented
no clear and convincing evidence to refute presumption, notice given to attorney of date set
for trial was good notice to defendant. Blake v.
Blake, 17 Utah 2d 369, 412 P.2d 454 (1966).
When service required.
—Default judgment.
Plaintiff was under no duty to notify defen-

dants of default judgment entered against
them. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656
P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982) (decided before 1985 addition of reference to Rule 55).
Plaintiffs' failure to mail a copy of the default judgment to defendants did not invalidate
the default judgment when defendants received the notice of default in time to move to
set aside the judgment. Lincoln Benefit Life
Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d
672 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Appeal.
Under former Rule 73(h), time for appeal
from default judgment in city court runs from
date of notice of entry of such judgment, rather
than from the date of judgment. Buckner v.
Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124, 288
P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Rule 58A(d)).
Cited in Remington-Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil, 4
Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416 (1956); Pillsbury
Mills, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 7
Utah 2d 286, 323 P.2d 266 (1958); Dehm v.
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976); Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298
(Utah 1982); Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581
(Utah 1984); Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806
(Utah 1986); Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Maverik Country Stores,
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at
Law § 6; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to
352.
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 15;
71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413.
A.L.R. — Construction of phrase "usual
place of abode," or similar terms referring to

abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes
relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112.
Service of process by mail in international
civil action as permissible under Hague Convention, 112 A.L.R. Fed. 241.
Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «=»
90; Pleading «=» 331 to 338.

Rule 6- Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor
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when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final,
only questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be considered.
(5) Draft report. Before filing his report a master may submit a draft
thereof to counsel for all parties for the purpose of receiving their suggestions,
(f) Objections to appointment of master. A party may object to the appointment of any person as a master on the same grounds as a party may
challenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action.
Such objections must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same manner as a motion.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 53, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Challenging of jurors
for cause, U.R.C.P. 47(f).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Report.
—Failure to object.
Waiver.
Scope of appointment.
Status as judicial officer.
Report.
F a il u r p to ohiprL

ft\e

J

e

Scope of appointment.
A special master who was directed to review
requests for cost reimbursements exceeded the
scope of his appointment by investigating and
reporting on the issue of attorney's fees since
the court had already ordered an award of attorney's fees and the parties had no notice that
the master was to review that award nor did
parties have an opportunity to participate
m tne
master's proceedings. Plumb v. State,
809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990).
Status as judicial officer.
.ftl m a s t e r h a s t h e d u t i e s a n d o M i
A

r"
i_ * j
i_- i.- i.
* >
One who made no objection to masters report as required by this rule could not question
the report for the first time on appeal from district court order adopting the master's findings. Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d 367 (Utah
1980).
COLLATERAL

engage in unethical ex parte contacts with the
judge overseeing the case on matters pertinent
to the substance of the referral. Plumb v. State,
809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990).
REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity
§§ 226, 228; 66 Am. Jur. 2d References §§ 1 et
seq., 30 et seq.
C.J.S. — 30A C.J.S. Equity §§ 515, 520, 521
to 528, 532, 533, 535, 537, 539 et seq.; 76 C.J.S.
References §§ 7 et seq., 60 to 110, 122 et seq.
A.L.R. — Bankruptcy, right of creditor who
has not filed timely petition for review of referee's order to participate in appeal secured by
another creditor, 22 A.L.R3d 914
Power of successor or substituted master or
referee to render decision or enter judgment on

testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
1079.
Referee's failure to file report within time
specified by statute, court order, or stipulation
a s terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889.
w ^ a r e "exceptional conditions" justifying
reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b),
i A L R Fed 922
Rey Numbers< _ E
i t ^ 3 9 3 to 3 9 5 4 0 1
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PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-

tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as
between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs,
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the
judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(3), (4) [Deleted.]
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective January 1, 1985.)
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3)
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the
appellate court and costs in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See,
now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 54, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Continuances, discre-

tion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P.
40(b).
Judges* retirement fee, taxing as costs,
§ 49-6-301.
State, payment of costs awarded against,
§ 78-27-13.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims,
U.R.C.P. 62(h).
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21-5-8.
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Absence of judge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in
case, or with partner or associate of such attorney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filmg motion for new trial in.civil case of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
., c . '
,.
,
i. • 1 •
A .1
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Court reporter's death or disability prior to

Rule 60

transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages
a lone new trial granted on ground of inadeq u a c y 0f damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th
375
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
d a m a g e s f o r personal injury to or death of seam a n -n a c t i o n g u n d e r J o n e s A c t ( 4 6 u s c s
0 CQQ,
, . . c
.,.
A
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
*K
n„ A T r> o J r^i
m d e r n c a s e s 9 6 A LR Fed 5 4 L
°
'
- J
Excessiveness
or
adequacy
of awards of dama e s for
S
personal injury or death in actions under
Federal
Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS
§§ 5 1 e t se(l-) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
189.
Key Numbers. — New Trial &=> 13 et seq.,
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
to set aside judgment, § 21-1-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

. .„ .
_. „M
Any other reason justifying relief.
—Default judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.

—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Mutual mistake.
— R e a l p a r t y i n inte rest.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
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Rule 68

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Order to make deposit.
In a suit by an auto leasing agency against a
bank for breach of a contract in which the latter had agreed to buy the rights to rentals on
cars leased by the agency, the trial court's order that all the funds in question be paid into
court or, alternatively, placed in a bank account was improper under this rule, since there
was no evidence that the leasing agency either

possessed the funds or held them as trustee for
the bank; even if the order had been proper,
the trial court's dismissal of agency's complaint for failure to comply with the order was
improper unless it appeared the agency had
the ability to comply but contumaciously refused to do so. Globe Leasing Corp. v. Bank of
Salt Lake, 547 P.2d 197 (Utah 1976).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Deposits in
Court § 1 et seq.
C.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Deposits in Court § 1 et
seq.
A.L.R. — Garnishment, funds deposited in
court as subject of, 1 A.L.R.3d 936.
Appealability of order directing payment of
money into court, 15 A.L.R.3d 568.

Eminent domain: payment or deposit of
award in court as affecting condemner's right
to appeal, 40 A.L.R.3d 203.
Key Numbers. — Deposits in Court «=» 1 et
seq.

Rule 68. Offer of judgment.
(a) Tender of money before suit. When in an action for the recovery of
money only, the defendant alleges in his answer that before the commencement of the action he tendered to the plaintiff the full amount to which the
plaintiff was entitled, and thereupon deposits in court for the plaintiff the
amount so tendered, and the allegation is found to be true, the plaintiff cannot
recover costs, but must pay costs to the defendant.
(b) Offer before trial. At any time more than 10 days before the trial
begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party
an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him for the money or property
or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days
after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the
offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance
together with proof of service thereof and thereupon judgment shall be entered. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof
is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment
finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree
must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an
offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (a) is similar to Rule 68, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Joint tort-feasors,
settlement and release, §§ 78-27-40 to
78-27-43.

Payment of medical or similar expenses not
admissible in evidence, U.R.E. 409.
Release, settlement or statement by injured
person, rescission or disavowal, §§ 78-27-32 to
78-27-36.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Offer before trial.
—Costs.
Attorney fees.
Bill of costs.
—Evidence.
Privilege.
Tender of money before suit.
—Mortgage foreclosure.
—Quiet title.
—Waiver of defects.
Offer before trial.
—Costs.
Attorney fees.
The costs provided for in this rule are limited
to taxable costs only and do not include attor-

ney fees. Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601
(Utah 1978).
Bill of costs.
Where defendants at commencement of trial
offered in writing to allow judgment for certain
sum and accrued costs in full satisfaction of
plaintiff's claims, plaintiff could file bill of
costs. Smith v. Nelson, 23 Utah 512, 65 P. 485
(1901).
—Evidence.
Privilege.
Letter Written before suit offering to permit
adverse party to take judgment for specific
amount was privileged and could not be used
as evidence. McKinney v. Carson, 35 Utah 180,
99 P. 660 (1909).
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Third Judicial District

JOHN E. HANSEN, #4590
STEVEN B. SMITH, #5797
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Defendant
Ann Anastasion
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-7870
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MERLE LEE ALLRED,
Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

:

vs.

:

ANN ANASTASION and SHAWN
ANASTASION,

:

Civil No. 910906462PI
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Defendants.

:

Defendant Ann Anastasion's Motions: for Relief from the
Judgment rendered against her pursuant to her Offer of Judgment to
Merle Allred; for costs, attorney fees and sanctions; and to
dismiss PacifiCorp and Aetna from this lawsuit came regularly
before the Court on the 27th day of August, 1993, at the hour of
4:00 p.m. pursuant to notice. Steven B. Smith of Scalley & Reading
appeared on behalf of Ann Anastasion and Blake Atkin appeared on
behalf of PacifiCorp and Aetna. Memoranda having been submitted by
the respective parties and the matter having been argued and
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submitted to the Court and the Court having rendered its decision
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Ann Anastasion made an Offer of Judgment to Merle

Lee Allred.
2.

That Offer of Judgment was never made nor extended

to PacifiCorp and or Aetna for their acceptance.
3.

That Offer of Judgment was intended to end all

litigation associated with Merle Allred's claim for personal
injuries against Ann Anastasion.
4.

PacifiCorp and Aetna attempted to accept that Offer

of Judgment and obtained a judgment against Ann Anastasion pursuant
to that purported acceptance.
5.

PacifiCorp and Aetna's only interest in this lawsuit

is a subrogation interest in Merle Allred's claim against Ann
Anastasion for reimbursement of monies it paid out for and on
behalf of Merle Allred.
6.

The amount set forth in Ann Anastasion's Offer of

Judgment to Merle Allred ($17,500.00) was over $2,500.00 greater
than the amount PacifiCorp and Aetna had paid for Merle Allred's
medical bills.
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7.

Counsel for Ann Anastasion disputed PacifiCorp's and

Aetna's right and capacity to accept the Offer of Judgment as soon
as they learned PacifiCorp and Aetna had attempted to accept it.
8.

PacifiCorp's and Aetna's claimed subjective belief

that the Offer of Judgment was made to them was not reasonable.
9.

PacifiCorp's and Aetna's failure to accept Ann

Anastasion's Offer of Judgment would not have obliged PacifiCorp
and Aetna to pay Ann Anastasion's costs in the event a verdict less
favorable than the Offer of Judgment was obtained against Ann
Anastasion.
10.

Plaintiff's

Third

Amended

Complaint

naming

PacifiCorp and Aetna as Defendants in this lawsuit was properly
filed with this Court.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

No power of acceptance of Ann Anastasion's Offer of

Judgment was ever created in PacifiCorp and or Aetna.
2.

At no time did either PacifiCorp or Aetna have the

right# power or authority to accept Ann Anastasion's Offer of
Judgment.
3.

The judgment obtained by PacifiCorp and Aetna is

vacated and has no legal force or affect whatsoever.
4.

Ann Anastasion's Offer of Judgment will have no

legal force or affect whatsoever.
C:\SBS\PLEADING\ANASTAS.FOF
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5.

Each party is to bear its own costs and attorney

6.

Sanctions are not appropriate under the facts and

fees.

circumstances upon which this Order is based.
ORDER
The judgment rendered for PacifiCorp and Aetna against
Ann Anastasion on August 4, 1993, is hereby vacated and Ann
Anastasion is relieved from any and all legal force and or affect
that judgment may have had.

Ann Anastasion's Motion for Costs,

Attorney's Fee and Sanctions is hereby defied and each party is to
bear its own costs.
DATED this

day of September, 1993.
THIRD DISTRICT COURT

Judge Timothy R. Hanson
MAILING CERTIFICATE

dTTl/Xl^

U

I hereby certify that on theQ^fl day of September, 1993,
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Steven B. Smith, Esq.
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Kelly R. Sheffield, Esq.
1364 Emigration Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Blake S. Atkin, Esq.
350 South 400 East, #114

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Sean Anastasion
Defendant Pro Se
364 East 600 South
Salt Lake City Utah 84111

ftn/ftwt
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,j*stnct

Ttwc

J OHN EDWARD H A N S E N ,
# 4 bill)
STEVEN B. SMITH, # »
SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Defendant
Ann Anastasion
261 East 300 South, „ ^ i ^ - ~ J
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (° A 1 ) r^ ! - 7 3'? 0
IN T H E THIRD JUDICIA.

hAK

y V'-QU

>

-STRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MERI.F. LEF; ALL

JUDGMENT O N JURY VERDICT

>,
rlaintiff,

Civil

vs.
ANN ANASTASION • "
ANASTASION,

"-! :-90646£PI

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

SHAWN

Defendants.
"III""IIi
7th,

ab'O"! re entitled matter came on regularly for trial the

8th and 9th oJ Kebruar}

I lie lionoiiih

Hai ison presiding, the case being tried to a )in i(

Plaintiff Merie

Lei,"" i i ILL it, [ill W A S represented l;> y K P M .

f field

PacIfiC^rr Electric

Operations and Aetna Health

i -pi esuin cil

Bonner.

Tin

Defendant Ann Anastas "i ,

u

"as represented by Steven 13.

. ^ jojjn Edward Hanson of 9rallpy fy -««dir*^" w a s person.:.

^pfendant Sean

."AMI I II HI ml

t

n t being t a k e n a g a i n s t hi 11 1 1 I 11 I m>t p a r t i c i p a t e as a p a r t y

mi

11 i .in

'. ni J V

r

li!il

After conclusion of the evidence, the case was submitted
to the jury on special verdict interrogatories and the jury
answered the following pertinent interrogatories:
1

Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you

find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant, Ann
Anastasion was negligent?
YES
2.

NO

X

Considering all of the negligence in this case, do

you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant,
Sean Anastasion, was negligent?
YES

NO

X

Based on the jury's response to the above-referenced
interrogatories, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that judgment is
entered in favor of Defendant Ann Anastasion and against Plaintiff
Merle Lee Allred of no cause of action.

It is further ordered,

adjudged and decreed that based upon the jury's verdict referred to
above, Plaintiff Merle Allred's Complaint against Defendant Ann
Anastasion is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Likewise, all

cross-claims and counter-claims of PacifiCorp Electric Operations
and Aetna Health Plans against Plaintiff Merle Lee Allred and
Defendant Ann Anastasion are also hereby dismissed with prejudice.
The default judgment taken by PacifiCorp Electric Operations and
B:\ANASTAS.JJV
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Aetna

Heal th

affected

PJ ai is aga I nst

Defendant

Sean

Anastasion

by the jury's verdict or thi s or der

is not

Defendai i t Ai n i

:.-;^*^s:i oi i ; s awarded costs as set forth in the Memorandum of Costs
previously submitted
DATED this

/"" ^ " ~* ^.-.

4.

BV^COUHT

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

rf

'f '" "Jay

I , 1^194, a

I mie and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment On .Jury Verdict was
mailed

fn\

pa •• I,

'oxiowing:

Steven B. Smith, Esq.
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kelly R, Sheffield,
13»'4 Emigration Street
Salt T.aki- fity Utah 84108
Blake S. Atkin, Esq.
350 South 400 East, #114
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Sean Anastasion
364 East 600 S O L
Salt Lake Cit]

S?

60€M.<*< ^

CI^^^1^
o
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m EDWARD HANSEN,
#4590
""/FN B. SMITH, #5797
•:Y & READING
Attorneys for Defendant
A n n Anastasion
East 300 South, Suite 200
-. Lake City, Utah 84112
T-.-ephone:
(801) 531 7R70
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FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW A N D ORDER REGARDING
THE AWARD OF COSTS TO T H E
PREVAILING PARTY

MER L,L:1 IL.KK ALl.iKhlL),
Plaintiff,

is

vs.
A N N ANASTASION, SEAN
ANASTASION, PACIFICORP
ELECTRIC OPERATIONS, A N D
A E T N A HEALTH PLANS,

Judge 1 ^.uot.zx

c

K. Hanson

Defendants
Defendant

Ann

Anastasion's

request

d.-- x-.: ?•-'•-"-*
Plaintiffs Aetna ii^^^i

costs

and

^f^r..1 -.rv ' ird-Party
-

*..j . , aj.::^„ip d e c l i n e operations'

(hereinafter collectively referred to as
M - '• "•- T *' '- A"1" ^ :'

for

Aetna

*h--c*-;-jns co A n n Ana~tac:^~'

and Plaintiff,
"' m c r a n d u m ^i

CosLo ana liiooursei;;ents nav^ng come regulai-> ot.:-:'- Cx.e .ourt, and
the Court having reviewed the materials submitted,, hereby makes the

following findings of fact, conclusions of law and enters the
following Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff paid the statutory jury demand fee of

2.

Subsequently

$50.00.
and

unnecessarily,

Defendant

Ann

Anastasion also paid the statutory jury demand fee of $50.00.
3.

Aetna's only involvement in this litigation dealt

with its subrogation rights as Plaintiff's health insurance carrier
and, throughout this litigation and for all purposes, stood in the
shoes of Plaintiff.
4.

The amount paid by Aetna for and on behalf of Merle

Allred was not in dispute.
5.

Aetna's only role in the trial of this matter was in

regards to Defendants' liability for the incident that caused
Plaintiff s injury.
6.

Depositions of the following individuals were all

necessarily and reasonably taken to properly defend this action:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Plaintiff, Merle Lee Allred;
Defendant, Sean Anastasion;
Defendant, Ann Anastasion;
Becky Sue Neville;
Dr. Robert Hansen; and
Dr. G. Lynn Rasmussen.

2

^efondan*" *nn A n a s t a s i o n n e c e s s a r i "i v ~r,d r e a s o n a b l y
paid

the

($17.00)

s:a' :/ .p.
~'

-11:..-^..

• ;i-- f o l l o w i n g

8 .

. -

•-•. . -

"0 I) :)1] ai: s

individuals:

:: .•

._ .. \ •• r o s s H o s p i t a l .l.*r. R o b e r t •" ' : ~::sen:
D e f e n d a n t , Sea:.
Anasr..i 3d 01 i;

d;
ef
-T

Ted Conger, D.C.;
Zr. David E. C u r t i s ;
Bryan C r e n n a n ; and
T^r n T ^ r n^ R a s m u s s e n .

?

1: :n =

i ne :i : :i ts

Defendai it.

\ \i in

A n a s t a s i o n , w a s tn- p r e v a i l i n g party.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
niyr-ii^t- *-r\ D<i]a c::\ . -? • P e f e r d an t A n n A n a s t a s i o n . as
the _. . -

•

she necessarily

a n , reasonably incurred m
•^f-ndan1-

sLi

- , J

..IU.V . *. .-j..

-

^r^'^^-^

-rs

d e f e n d i n g this a c t i o n .

cannot r e c o v e r t h e amount

p.-

-c.a a n a P i a i n t i t i are -ointly and severally liable
for * h^ ^ s t s incurred by Defendant Arm A n a s t a s i o n w h i c h r e l a t e to
] :i i il

. .-

.-

•

l; .a r.Liff :s solely liable
incurred
eslafal i-o. . <-

Defends-

?\nasf asi ':n
1. i i

3

nor uhe costs a n d fees
-~:r„h

^elated
•

to

nages.

the

ORDER
After reviewing the memoranda submitted by all parties
and the applicable law, being fully informed and for good cause
shown the Court hereby Orders that:
1.

Both Aetna and Plaintiff are jointly and severally

liable to Ann Anastasion, the prevailing party, for the following
costs:

2.

a)

court reporter fees for the depositions of
Defendant Ann Anastasion, Defendant Sean
Anastasion
and
Plaintiff,
Merle
L.
Allred(first deposition only) in an amount of
$ 288.10; and

b)

witness fees paid to Sean Anastasion and Bryan
Drennan in an amount of $34.00.

Plaintiff is solely liable to Ann Anastasion, the

prevailing party, for the following costs:

3.

a)

court reporter fees for the depositions of
Merle L. Allred(2nd deposition only), Becky
Sue Neville, Dr. Robert P. Hansen, and Dr. G.
Lynn Rasmussen in the amount of $874.70; and

b)

witness fees paid to Holy Cross Hospital, Dr.
Robert P. Hansen, Ted Conger, D.C., Dr. David
E. Curtis, Bryan Drennan, and Dr. G. Lynn
Rasmussen in the amount of $119.00.

Defendant Ann Anastasion can only collect a total of

One Thousand Three Hundred Fifteen and 80/100 Dollars ($1,315.80)
of the costs necessarily incurred in successfully defending against
Plaintiff's and Aetna's claims.
solely

liable

for

$993.70

of

Plaintiff Merle L. Allred, is
that

4

amount

and

Defendant

Ann

Anastasion can collect the remaining $322.10 from either of the
parties «o^ i "-crticn fro71! °ach ^f rheir
-i- Elect:::. Anastasion

peiaM::.

.-. M: e ::i agaii ist
and

Ae:,na

Hea„::!; Pi ans

in

Paci ficoi: p

favor

of

.Ann

i r * ~- amount ^i Three Hundred Twenty Two and 10/100

idgment shall be entered against Merle Lee Allred

avc

Ar ^stasio*

DATED this £iO

day o'

/Judge Timoth
District Cou;
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of August, 1994,

that a true and correct copy of the forgoing Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order was mailed postage prepaid, addressed
to the following:
Kelly R. Sheffield, Esq.
1364 Emigration Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108
Blake S. Atkin, Esq.
50 South Main Street, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Steven B. Smith
SCALLEY & READING
261 East 300 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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